Ukraine’s future depends not only on timely military support and tangible security guarantees for a just and sustainable peace, but also on the efficiency and fairness of the recovery and reconstruction process. Much of this process will take place at the municipal level, given the extensive damage to civilian infrastructure wrought by Russia’s strikes. Local self-government bodies (LSGs), which have already proven to be a critical component of social resilience in Ukraine, are key participants in this process.[i]
Corruption can erode the quality and speed of local recovery, as evidenced by already-known cases of alleged embezzlement in contracts at both the municipality and regional military administration (RMA) levels.[ii] And this is despite the fact that there are overall fewer reports of corruption in local public services in 2024 than before Russia’s full-scale invasion.[iii]
Cases of local corruption should prompt the strengthening of the anti-corruption capacity of local self-government bodies for the sake of advancing democratic governance
In response to local corruption, central executive authorities and policy-makers tend to centralise power even more. This is often justified by the ability of the executive branch to coordinate administrative activities,[iv] which should contribute to stricter control and clearer processes. For example, Draft Law 5655 invokes anti-corruption to argue for issuing building permits in municipalities, which would effectively deprive them of their urban planning powers, contrary to the Constitution and the Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government” (“On Local Self-Government...” | No. 280/97-ВР dated 21 May 1997). However, given the history of abuse of anti-corruption measures to concentrate power in Ukraine before the Revolution of Dignity,[v] this sort of centralisation might contribute to authoritarian tendencies that would be rather difficult to weed out in wartime. Moreover, international experience of donor-supported recovery efforts shows that disempowering local authorities in the name of efficiency actually undermines the process of state-building by obstructing accountability at the local level.[vi]
Therefore, anti-corruption measures during recovery should factor in the goal of democracy building in Ukraine, recognising local self-government bodies as key actors through their accountability to municipalities. Accordingly, anti-corruption measures should be decentralised subject to the capabilities and limitations of the anti-corruption capacity of local self-government bodies. These measures must be assessed with consideration to their impact on the balance of powers in the system of multi-level governance in Ukraine.
Experience and incentives of local self-government bodies to prevent corruption: the subsidiarity effect
Local self-government bodies themselves are not new to implementing anti-corruption safeguards, transparency especially.[vii] Both before and during the full-scale invasion, and in quite sensitive areas at that, such as the management of land and real estate owned by the municipality. In addition, the experience of local self-government bodies indicates the ability to innovate, as evidenced by the introduction of geographic information systems and open data portals, progress in public engagement in decision-making through open governance tools, as well as the use of Prozorro and Prozorro.Sale. Some local self-government bodies also have their own effective internal audits, quality control departments and project offices and have already learned to effectively use corruption risk analysis tools and deploy authorised units (persons) for the prevention and detection of corruption.
Although local self-government bodies have significant gaps in their capacity to introduce and use anti-corruption safeguards, many find workarounds — this usually depends little on the size of the municipality or proximity to the front lines. Rather, local self-government bodies, thanks to the introduction of the subsidiarity principle following the Decentralisation Reform, have rational incentives to improve the quality of governance:
- First, given their responsibility for providing social services and seeking resources for recovery, local self-government bodies have an incentive to be transparent and accountable in order to show their reliability as recipients of aid and investment from donors or businesses.
- Second, especially in small municipalities with public activists, local authorities are sensitive even to rumours of corruption, as well as more likely to have a sense of belonging to the municipality. After all, government officials often use the same services as other residents and feel that they are part of a community.
Three directions for strengthening the anti-corruption capacity of local self-government bodies
Based on a study conducted for the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre at the Chr. Mikkelsen Institute (CMI, Norway), three directions can be identified for strengthening the anti-corruption capacity of local self-government bodies:
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Enhancing transparency regarding the activities, assets and decision-making of local self-government bodies.
Being transparent means proving that this municipality or LSG can be trusted by a donor or investor. And as a component of cooperation, trust is just as important as the economic or humanitarian motives of the investor or donor, respectively. Since many municipalities already know this from practice, they report on the assistance received, create public investment passports, etc. Further efforts should be aimed at solving problems with transparency in municipal property management, procurement and housing to ensure that in addition to being aware of possible solutions, the public is engaged in the decision-making process in advance, before anything is finalised. This includes, among other things, the publication of agendas for local council meetings, including detailed information on land issues.
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Strengthening the capacity of local self-government bodies to identify and address gaps in their own institutional design and administrative processes.
While outward anti-corruption should continue to receive attention, resources and expertise are needed to support LSG institution-building on principles of integrity. This involves redesigning internal processes that cannot be easily assessed from the outside, such as developing internal procurement standards, reorganising departments to eliminate duplication or gaps in functions, introducing quality control or conducting corruption risk assessments (CRA). Such measures are rarely a priority for local self-government bodies due to resource constraints and the significant cost of institutional change.
To set up internal anti-corruption safeguards, LSGs should cooperate with the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), which offers tools for assessing corruption risks, training on whistleblower protection, asset declaration and conflict of interest prevention policies. International partners can follow the example of the EU Anti-Corruption Initiative, which supports local self-government bodies in reforming their processes and institutional design under the Integrity Cities component.
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Promoting intersectoral cooperation at the local level.
Local anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine have often emerged at the intersection of different social spheres. In cities that demonstrated “political will” to fight corruption, local government officials, civil society activists, experts and businesses often came to organic changes through constant communication, identification of shared and clashing views, and — in cases of the most long-term changes — common interest.
It is therefore important to foster conditions for a continuous and organic dialogue, focused on solving local problems or on local development, between different municipal actors. International partners can often help with resources and expertise to set up these processes. An example is the joint initiative between U-LEAD’s Integrity House project and the NACP’s Integrity Territory programme, which has contributed to building constructive communication among authorities, businesses and the public in order to find a common goal in the participating municipalities.
To sum up, we would like to emphasise that the quality of Ukraine’s recovery depends not only on effective governance, but also on the ability to uphold democracy. Large funds for reconstruction can lead to local corruption and, at the national level, to the desire to centralise power under the pretext of combating it. To balance efficiency and democracy, local self-government bodies need to strengthen their anti-corruption capacities, seeking support if necessary. To bolster trust from municipalities and partners, local self-government bodies must ensure transparency, improve internal processes and cooperate with the public and businesses.
[i] Oleksandra Keudel and Oksana Huss, “What Makes Ukraine Resilient in the Asymmetric War? Polycentric Governance in Practice,” Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, n.d.; Maryna Rabinovych et al., “Explaining Ukraine’s Resilience to Russia’s Invasion: The Role of Local Governance,” Governance 1, no. 20 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12827.
[ii] There have been reported cases in, for example, Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih, as well as in regard to the Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk Regional Military Administrations.
[iii] IRI, “Nineth Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey. April–May 2024” (International Republican Institute, 2024), 86, https://www.iri.org/resources/ninth-annual-ukrainian-municipal-survey-april-may-2024/.
[iv] Peter Nasuti, “Administrative Cohesion and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia and Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 5 (May 27, 2016): 847–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1192107.
[v] Oksana Huss, How Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policies Sustain Hybrid Regimes. Strategies of Political Domination under Ukraine’s Presidents in 1994-2014 (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2020).
[vi] Jennifer Murtazashvili, “Pathologies of Centralized State-Building,” Prism : A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 8, no. 2 (2019): 54–67; Roger B. Myerson, “Local Politics and Democratic State-Building,” Journal of Democracy 33, no. 4 (2022): 62–73.
[vii] Вікторія Онищенко et al., “Прозорість Під Обстрілами: Чи Досягли Міста Прогресу?,” 2024, https://www.transparentcities.in.ua/storage/media/tK/template_files/default/QYweNSMFduBTt4eEaoW33H592uPboGwmF4pnmm93.pdf.
